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It is a common, sometimes daily, occurrence to walk 
into a supermarket and see aisles upon aisles of different product 
options. Twenty four types of olive oil. Fifteen types of milk. 
Fifty types of ice cream. This all comes from the belief that 
more is better,  particularly when it comes to having options. 
This belief then pushes suppliers to offer more variety in hopes 
that it will attract more customers and increase sales. Even 
beyond product variety, having more options is generally looked 
upon favorably as many people tend to go for choices that leave 
their options open .  
 This is a belief that seems to be supported by more than 
the shelving habits of the local grocery store. One often finds 
that in studies of psychological wellness and marketing strategy, 
it is shown that the practice of personal choice has various 
positive effects. One study finds that the provision of choice can 
increase intrinsic motivation and perceived confidence, as 
children of autonomy-oriented grade school teachers reported 
more self-motivation and higher self-esteem than the children 
of more control-oriented teachers (Deci, 1981). Another study 
finds that having the ability to choose for oneself can increase 
task performance, as nursing home patients that are allowed 
more choice in their life show greater alertness, active 
participation, and a general sense of well-being  (Langer & 
Rodin, 1976). Even if a person does not actually have more 
agency to choose, just the illusion of choice is enough to incite 
positive effects. The unwarranted illusion of choice has been 
associated with greater confidence (Langer, 1975) and even the 
ability to care about others, the ability to be happy or contented, 
and the ability to engage in productive and creative work  
(Taylor & Brown, 1988). Some research has even shown that 
when people and animals feel like their ability to choose is taken 
away with regard to impending reinforcements, severely 
negative consequences can result including distractibility, 
ulcers, or death (Lefcourt, 1973). Clearly this last example 
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Abstract 
Choice Overload is a phenomenon well studied in psychology. It goes against the classical more is better  dogma and describes 
the behavior of an agent when presented with too many options, in which instance an agent may either experience a decrease in 
satisfaction or end up deferring the choice all together. The standard Utility Maximization model of economics, however, largely 
follows the classical dogma and is unable to accommodate the behaviors of Choice Overload. This paper seeks to offer two 
possible economic models for Choice Overload based on the two mechanisms put forward by the psychological literature: search 
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features instances of choice that are much more extreme than 
deciding what kind of ice cream to buy, but it still indicates the 
importance of choice. 
From studies such as these, a common notion has been 
developed saying that it is always better to have more options 
and that variety is always a virtue. Why then do a plethora of 
marketing studies find that there are benefits from a reduction 
of variety in stores? In response to retailers  reluctance to reduce 
stock even in response to declining demand for fear of attracting 
fewer customers, one study researched how consumers perceive 
retail assortment and found that a reduction of specifically low-
demand items does not significantly affect assortment 
perception (Broniarczyk et al, 1998). Other studies go further in 
showing how having more variety on store shelves may increase 
attractiveness to customers with diminishing returns (Roberts & 
Lattin, 1991) and how a larger product line may in some cases 
decrease the likelihood that that brand is chosen (Draganska & 
Jain, 2005). Still other marketing research papers talk about a 
necessary balance between perceived assortment variety  and 
perceived inter-item complexity , implying that there is an 
upper bound to the benefits of variety (Kahn, Weingarten, & 
Townsend, 2013). 
The conflicting results of previous psychological 
studies that have praised the prospect of choice and marketing 
studies that warn of the dangers of too much variety have caused 
psychologists to go back and research in more detail the effects 
of varying levels of choice. From this research, several 
psychological studies have subsequently concluded that more 
options may not always lead to better results. One study found 
that when college students had to select soft drink flavors from 
a given set of options, satisfaction with their choice did not 
differ depending on the size of the choice set (Reibstein, 
Youngblood, & Fromkin, 1975). Others have indicated that 
having a choice set that is too large can actually lead to a 
decrease in satisfaction. Barry Schwartz, a psychology professor 
at Swarthmore College, wrote a famous book titled The Paradox 
of Choice: Why More Is Less that laments the gratuity of 
options not only in stores but also in life as people struggle to 
balance career, family, and individual needs,   and suggests 
that self-limiting one s choices can lead to greater satisfaction 
with those choices (Schwartz, 2004). Even the act of choosing 
has been shown to have its limits in its positive effects. One 
study found that participants who were tasked with making 
more decisions experienced less physical stamina, reduced 
persistence in the face of failure, more procrastination, and less 
quality and quantity of arithmetic calculations  (Vohs et al, 
2008). This phenomenon has been titled Choice Overload, and 
it refers to a collection of behaviors that can arise from engaging 
with too much variety and choice including unhappiness, 
decision fatigue, choosing a default option, and deferring the 
choice all together (that is, choosing not to choose). Recently, 
psychologists have moved on from simply proving the existence 
of Choice Overload to trying to find its specifications and limits. 
A meta-analysis conducted in 2014 collected all such research 
and concluded that whether or not Choice Overload is prompted 
depends on choice set complexity, decision task difficulty, 
preference uncertainty, and decision goal  (Chernev, 
Böckenholt, & Goodman, 2014). 
To talk more specifically about Choice Overload in a 
consumer context, this paper draws inspiration from what is 
probably the most famous instance of research on Choice 
Overload: the jam study by Sheena S. Iyengar and Mark R. 
Lepper in 2000. Iyengar and Lepper set up a tasting booth to sell 
jam in a grocery store known for its variety of offerings and its 
established tasting booth culture. Over the course of two 5-hour 
periods on two Saturdays, they observed 754 shoppers and their 
consumption behavior. In one period, they displayed 6 jams (the 
limited set) while in the other period they displayed 24 jams (the 
extensive set). Iyengar and Lepper had experimenters 
clandestinely monitor the tasting booth to see what percent of 
passing customers stopped to taste the jams and then what 
percentage of those tasters ended up actually purchasing some 
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jam. Following the common belief that more is better , 60% of 
passing customers (145 of 240) stopped at the extensive jam 
display while only 40% of passing customers (104 of 260) 
stopped at the limited jam display. The purchasing behavior, 
however, seem to support instead the concept of Choice 
Overload. The limited display showed 30% (31 of 104) of the 
tasters ended up buying some jam while only 3% (4 of 145) 
ended up buy jam after stopping at the extensive display. Having 
the extensive set to choose from seemed to cause consumers to 
more often defer their choice. Surprisingly, this result 
demonstrates that though people seem initially attracted to 
greater variety, having more options may not always lead to a 
better outcome, in this case more revenue for the booth.  
The same paper by Iyengar and Lepper includes 
another study that tests how a varying amount of options can 
affect the consumer s satisfaction with their choice. They took 
134 chocolate-loving Columbia University students and asked 
them to choose some chocolate from a set of options. One group 
of subjects was able to choose a piece of chocolate from 6 
options and the other group could choose a piece of chocolate 
from 30 options. A control group was simply given a piece of 
chocolate to eat. Afterwards, the experimenters asked the 
subjects to rate how tasty, enjoyable, and satisfying the 
chocolate was on a scale of 1 to 7, which was then combined 
into a composite score of the subject s overall satisfaction with 
their chosen piece of chocolate. The results show a similar 
pattern to the one in the jam experiment. There was a 
statistically significant difference in the rated satisfaction levels, 
with subjects who chose from the limited set showing an 
average rating of 6.28 and subjects who chose from the 
extensive set showing an average rating of 5.46. Both choice 
groups, however, showed more satisfaction with the chocolate 
than did the control group. This indicates that there is some 
utility to be gained from getting a choice, but at a certain point, 
the process of choosing begins to hinder the satisfaction of the 
experience.  
These experiments imply two important findings. First, 
though there is some utility in variety, at some point the process 
of choosing from too many options begins to decrease 
satisfaction from that choice. Second, having too many options 
may at some point become preventative, making the consumer 
defer the choice for a later time.  
 
2. DIFFERENCE FROM STANDARD 
ECONOMIC THEORY 
Despite multiple studies showing that choice overload 
is a set pattern of human behavior, particularly in regards to 
consumption, standard economic theory fails to be able to 
explain it. In the standard model, there exists a set of all possible 
alternatives, called a domain, but agents choose from a non-
empty subset of available alternatives, called a menu, which will 
be represented as B. For the sake of both simplicity and 
practicality, menus under consideration in this paper can be 
taken to be finite menus, menus with a finite amount of items. 
The standard model assumes that agents have a utility function. 
A utility function is a function that assigns a utility value to 
every item in a menu. The choice that a subject makes is the 
item(s) that the subject selects from the menu B, denoted C(B). 
Formally, it is presumed that an agent faces a certain menu 
multiple times and each time the agent picks one item from the 
menu, but that chosen item may not always be the same. For 
instance, considering a menu B = {a, b}, they could choose 
options a sometimes and option b at other times, making the 
choice from the menu including those two alternatives equal to 
C(B) = {a, b}. In other cases, the agent may always choose b 
over a, in which case C(B) = {b}. C(B) is the subset of B 
consisting of the alternatives that the agent is observed to 
choose. The way that subjects choose which items to select is 
by following their utility function. Thus the choice of the 
standard model is 
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𝐶 𝐵 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑎∈𝐵
𝑈 𝑎  
 
In the standard model, C(B) is the set of elements in the 
menu that maximize the utility function, hence why this model 
is also called the Utility Maximization model. Since C(B) is 
always predetermined for a given menu via an agent s utility 
function, it can be said that the utility of the menu as a whole is 
also predetermined by the utility of the alternatives in C(B). The 
value of a menu to an agent is defined by the maximum utility 
they can achieve from the menu through their choices. This 




𝑈 𝑎 , 
 
where V(B) is defined by the maximum value of U(a) where a 
is any item, or element, in menu B. As discussed in Section 2, 
consumers experience a certain level of satisfaction with their 
choice and with their experience when making a purchase. This 
is the natural interpretation of asking about one s value function. 
Given this standard model, two propositions are 
presented as key properties. 
The first proposition states that larger menus yield 
higher satisfaction. 
 
Proposition 1 [Monotonicity]: F  a  e  B,B , if 𝐵 ⊂
𝐵  𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑈 𝐵 𝑈 𝐵 . 
 
Proof:  If 𝐵 ⊂ 𝐵′, then the maximizer of U in B lies in 
B  as well. Therefore, the maximizer in B  has to be at 





𝑈 𝑎 . Thus 𝑈 𝐵 𝑈 𝐵 . •  
 
The intuition for the proof is as follows: If a menu B  is 
comprised of menu B plus some additional elements, then those 
new elements can have utilities higher, lower, or equivalent to 
the element with the maximum utility in B. If lower or 
equivalent, the maximum utility in the new set stays the same. 
If higher, however, this new element becomes the new 
maximum utility of the menu. Thus, the value of the maximum 
utility element of the new menu can only stay the same or 
increase by adding more elements. Putting this into different yet 
equivalent words, the utility of a menu can only stay the same 
or increase by adding more elements, since the utility of a menu 
in the standard model is the same thing as the value of the 
maximum utility element of that menu. 
This implication of the standard model is not directly 
testable, because utility is not directly observable. If we follow 
the psychologists and take their measures of satisfaction as a 
measure of utility, however, then utility can then be treated as 
an observable object. It should be noted that this is a practice of 
psychology since economists do not measure utility and instead 
almost exclusively generate conclusions based on observed 
choices, making the prior assumption non-standard. 
While the first proposition focuses on the satisfaction 
gained from a choice, the second proposition questions whether 
a choice should be made at all; in other words, deferral. In order 
to talk about deferral of choice, that behavior must first be 
defined formally. Informally, deferral is defined as the decision 
to not make a choice at the present time. Formally, fix an 
alternative, represented as o , and interpret it as the agent s 
outside option. For example, customers at a restaurant can either 
choose an item from the menu or they can choose not to choose 
and leave the restaurant. In this case, leaving the restaurant is 
the outside option, which is equivalent to the customer choosing 
deferral and refusing to make a choice.  
The second proposition states that if a non-deferral 
choice was chosen in one menu, adding more options to that 
menu will not result in the agent now choosing to defer the 
choice. 
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Proposition 2 [Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives]: For 
a  e  B, B  ch ha  𝑜 ∈ 𝐵 ⊂ 𝐵 ,   𝑖𝑓 𝑜 ∉ 𝐶 𝐵  𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 o ∉
 𝐶 𝐵 . 
 
Proof: Since menus are finite, there always exists a 
maximizer. Therefore, if     o ∉  𝐶 𝐵 , there must exist 
some other alternative 𝑎 ∈ 𝐵 such that 𝑎 ∈ 𝐶 𝐵 . In 
particular 𝑈 𝑜 𝑈 𝑎). Thus, in the larger menu B , 
there still exists the alternative a, so o can never 
maximize utility and 𝑜 ∉  𝐶 𝐵 . •  
 
The intuition for this proof is as follows: If an element 
c is chosen from menu B, and deferral is not chosen from B, that 
must mean that c has the maximum utility of all elements in B 
and it has a greater utility than deferral, by nature of Utility 
Maximization. Then, if B  is a larger menu made from adding a 
few more elements onto B, then the maximum utility of B  can 
only be larger than or equal to the maximum utility of B (see 
proof for Proposition 1).  This necessitates that the utility of 
deferral is still less than the maximum utility of B , which means 
that it cannot be chosen within the Utility Maximization model. 
Another way of proving Proposition 2 uses a well-
known property of Utility Maximization: Se  Al ha. Sen s 
Alpha more generally states the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA) which says that if a is chosen from a big set 
B , then it must also be chosen from any small set 𝐵 ⊂ 𝐵′ that 
contains a (Sen, 1971). 
  
Definition [Se  A a]: C a i fie  Se   if f  a  ai  f 
e  B, B  a d al e a i e 𝑎 such that 𝑎 ∈ 𝐵 ⊂ 𝐵′, if 
𝑎 ∈ 𝐶 𝐵  𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑎 ∈ 𝐶 𝐵 . 
 
Alternative Proof of Proposition 2: Observe that if the 
default option is chosen in the big menu, the default 
option must also be chosen in the small menu. Then if 
o is not chosen in the small menu, it cannot be chosen 
in the big menu. •  
 
These propositions are implied by the Utility 
Maximization model, thus if people behaved according to the 
standard model of economics, observed human behavior would 
show the patterns described in Propositions 1 and 2. In fact, 
these two propositions support the aforementioned common 
belief that having more options is always a good thing, which is 
why grocery stores will dedicate entire aisles to different types 
of potato chips and peanut butter companies will offer more than 
12 types of peanut butter. At first glance, it indeed seems like 
real world actions follow from the conclusions of these two 
propositions, but as has already been shown, that simply is not 
the case. 
Many studies of choice psychology demonstrate that 
these testable implications arising from the standard model and 
described in the propositions above are violated in real life. 
Increasing the size of a menu can lead to less satisfaction with 
both the process of choosing and with the eventually chosen 
item, and once increased to a certain degree, the size of a menu 
can become so daunting that the agent prefers not to make a 
choice and defers their choice even though they would make a 
choice with a smaller menu. This difference between the 
standard model and observed behavior stems from the 
assumption that in Utility Maximization, the agent is able to 
analyze and compare alternatives without any cost. Once a 
menu is presented, the agent already knows their utility function 
and can use that to effortlessly and instantly compare all the 
options to figure out which alternative is the maximizer. This 
kind of agent would walk into the potato chip aisle and leave it 
one second later with the type of chips that they know will give 
them the highest utility. Does this really sound like real life? No, 
in fact, far from it. Whether it s in the grocery store or in the 
middle of the night staring into a fridge for far too long, making 
choices requires time and effort. Without this cost of decision 
5
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making, a real life consumer might indeed only stand to benefit 
from having more options available to them. Given that decision 
making does come with a cost, however, the costless Utility 
Maximization model cannot account for the observed behavior 
of choice overload. As such, an expansion of the standard model 
is required. Specifically, this new model must be able to 
accommodate Choice Overload behavior by violating the above 
propositions, thus instead having the properties of 
nonmonotonicity and choice deferral. 
 
 
3. ALTERNATIVE MODELS WITH 
CHOICE OVERLOAD 
The task of formulating a model to account for choice 
overload first requires that the exact mechanism of choice 
overload is understood. In fact, there are two main mechanisms 
through which choice overload is speculated to take effect in the 
psychological literature (Mills, Meltzer, & Clark, 1977; Payne, 
1982; Schwartz, 2004). The first assumes that in smaller menus, 
the cost of evaluating all the available alternatives is not 
prohibitively high, so agents simply analyze them all and follow 
utility maximization. In menus that are larger than a certain 
threshold, however, the cost of evaluating all the alternatives 
such that maximization can occur is higher than the potential 
payoff from maximization. Thus, to decrease the cost of 
evaluation, the agent instead follows a satisficing behavior and 
uses some heuristic to make a quicker choice. Satisficing occurs 
when an agent selects an option not because it is the maximum 
utility choice, but because it meets a minimum utility goal. Prior 
economic research on search costs has focused on the subject of 
company incentives for obfuscation (Ellison & Wolitzky, 2012), 
but that subject addresses only consumers  knowledge of 
aspects of a certain number of products and does little to analyze 
the connection between the number of alternatives and 
consumers  purchasing behavior.  
The second mechanism assumes that the agent doesn t 
fully understand their current preferences, such as when a 
consumer decides to buy a product they have never tried before, 
and they will only discover their preference with certainty after 
the choice is made. This allows for the possibility of regret if the 
agent finds out that they could have chosen an alternative that 
would ve given them higher utility than the alternative they did 
choose. With larger menus, there is more chance that within the 
set of alternatives not chosen, there will be an item that would 
give higher utility than the item that was chosen, thus inducing 
greater regret and less net utility. There have been a handful of 
papers concerning regret in economic literature, starting with 
the basic regret model (Loomes & Sudgen, 1982) and going on 
to the MinMax Regret model (Hayashi, 2007), but these models 
have largely not been applied to Choice Overload and do not 
allow for special circumstances of Choice Overload 
demonstrated in psychological research, such as the possibility 
that larger menus can lead to higher utility under certain 
conditions (see Appendix for further discussion). 
Some psychological studies have shown evidence of 
both mechanisms occurring in different circumstances (Mills, 
Meltzer, & Clark, 1977; Payne, 1982; Schwartz, 2004). As such, 
this paper will present two possible models of Choice Overload. 
 
Model 1: The Search Cost Model 
 
This model type describes the mechanism whereby the 
agent must incur some cost of decision making to evaluate all 
the alternatives and search for the utility maximizing one before 
they can make a choice. This search cost prevents the agent from 
being able consider a near infinite amount of alternatives, 
because eventually the cost of decision making becomes so 
great that it surpasses the maximum utility gained from the 
eventually chosen alternative. To begin to codify this 
6
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mechanism of Choice Overload into an economic model, one 
must introduce this search cost into the process of choosing. Say 
that an agent believes with probability p that they will follow a 
utility function U1, and with probability 1  p  they will follow 
a utility function U2. When facing the menu, however, the agent 
doesn t know which of these is the true utility function. For 
instance, a consumer may not know what features of a car they 
value most when buying a car for the first time. Only after 
incurring the cost of searching the entire menu, K(n), can they 
discover their utility function. Thus before incurring this cost, 
the agent must use these probabilities to form a belief about their 
expected maximum utility gain from conducting the search. In 
either scenario, if the agent makes a choice they will choose the 
maximizer of the menu, but that maximizer may differ 
depending on the utility function they follow. Thus, the cost of 
searching the menu is K(n) and expected utility gain from 




𝑈𝑖 𝑎 𝑝 ∗ max𝑎∈𝐵 𝑈1 𝑎 1 𝑝 ∗ max𝑎∈𝐵 𝑈2 𝑎  
 
It is assumed that the agent has no uncertainty about the 
value of the outside option, U1(o) = U2(o) = 0. The agent then 
compares the potential gain and the cost and decides if it s worth 
it to search the menu, find the maximum, and make the choice. 
If the cost of searching the menu is greater than the potential 
utility gain, the agent does not spend the effort and instead 
defers the choice. If the cost of searching the menu is less than 
the potential utility gain, then the agent still stands to gain from 
making a choice. The agent will then search the menu for the 
maximum, resulting in the agent becoming certain of their 
utility function. Thus their choice is defined as such for a menu 
Bn with n alternatives including the outside option, o, assuming 
that the search reveals a true utility function Ui  
 
𝐶 𝐵𝑛  
  argmax
𝑎∈𝐵𝑛
𝑈𝑖 𝑎   if   𝐸 max𝑎∈𝐵𝑛
𝑈𝑖 𝑎 𝐾 𝑛  0
𝑜                       if   𝐸 max
𝑎∈𝐵𝑛
𝑈𝑖 𝑎 𝐾 𝑛  0
  
 
Making the value function, V, defined as follows 
 
𝑉 𝐵𝑛
  𝐸 max
𝑎∈𝐵𝑛
𝑈𝑖 𝑎 𝐾 𝑛   if   𝐸 max𝑎∈𝐵𝑛
𝑈𝑖 𝑎 𝐾 𝑛  0
0                                      if   𝐸 max
𝑎∈𝐵𝑛
𝑈𝑖 𝑎 𝐾 𝑛  0
  
 
It is easily seen that if the agent does make a choice, the 
resulting utility gain will be less than the utility gain they would 
experience in the standard Utility Maximization model. Thus, 
this Search Cost model is able to show how larger menus lead 
to less satisfaction (nonmonotonicity) and can possibly lead to 
deferral. In this way, the Search Cost model is able to 
accommodate the behavior of Choice Overload. 
It should be noted that this model makes an important 
assumption about the nature of the agent, and that is that once 
the agent has begun searching through the entire menu, they 
must continue until all of the alternatives in the menu have been 
evaluated. Only then can the agent identify the maximizer and 
choose it. It may be the case, however, that an agent might begin 
analyzing the alternatives of a menu and when they reach a point 
where the cost of searching the menu becomes too great, rather 
than defer they may switch their method of decision making and 
become a satisficer instead of a maximizer. This would decrease 
the cost of searching the menu, making the decision once again 
worth making. In fact, psychologists say that each person is not 
necessarily only a maximizer nor only a satisficer. Every person 
has a certain inclination towards maximizing in any given 
situation. In one experiment analyzing, among other things, the 
effect of maximizing on choice overload, subjects had to take a 
questionnaire that would rate their maximization inclination on 
a 1 to 7 scale. Subjects who scored higher on this scale were 
more inclined to maximize when making a choice. The 
researchers defined maximizers  to be those in the top third of 
7
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the range (above 5.26/7) and satisficers  to be those in the 
bottom third (below 3.49/7). Their results indicated that 
maximizers experience Choice Overload more strongly than do 
satisficers (Schwartz et al, 2002). This result supports the 
assumption of the Search Cost model that agents are strict 
maximizers. If the agents were strict satisficers, then the model 
would not apply since they do not experience Choice Overload, 
at least not as strongly. A model could be proposed that includes 
a variable to indicate an agent s inclination toward 
maximization, but for simplicity s sake the model presented 
here just assumes that agents are maximizers, thus they must 
search the whole menu before making a choice. 
After some thought about the mechanism behind search 
cost, it quickly becomes apparent that there are many nuanced 
differences in the ways that the cost of searching for the 
maximum  can be defined. When an agent evaluates 
alternatives in a menu, they must be able to do two things. First, 
they must be able to discover or assign a utility value for each 
item. For example, when buying a car, a consumer must take a 
look at all the features of a car before they can fully understand 
the utility that car will have for them. Second, they must have 
some way of comparing the utilities of alternatives to figure out 
a preference ranking for them. Here, the consumer is looking at 
the difference in features between two cars and deciding which 
car is better based on the features that they most value. After 
completing both of these processes, the consumer is finally able 
to determine which of the available cars is the best and make 
their choice.  
In Utility Maximization, this is all assumed away such 
that it is done costlessly with the agent s utility function. In real 
life, however, both of these processes involve some cost, usually 
manifesting in the form of time or mental strain. The cost, 
however, can also be monetary if the agent, for example, pays a 
car expert to compare the cars for them or there is a fee 
associated with test driving the cars to discover how smoothly 
each one handles the road. In any case, the search cost can come 
from either of these two processes. Considering each of these 
two processes separately and independently, two different 
formulations of the search cost are possible. 
The first formulation considers the case in which the 
cost of decision making comes from discovering the utility to be 
gained from each alternative and each utility discovery induces 
a cost c. Thus, for a menu with n items,  
 
𝐾 𝑛  𝑐 ∗ 𝑛 
 
In this formulation, the agent does not know the utility 
to be gained from each choice before the menu is searched. Once 
the utility of each element is known, the agent is able to 
implement their utility function to immediately and without cost 
discover which element would produce the highest gain in 
utility. This formulation assumes for simplicity that the cost to 
discover the utility of one element is the same for all elements 
in the menu. In the resulting value function equation, both the 
expected maximum utility in menu B and the cost of evaluating 
the utilities of the entire menu are increasing in n (See 
Proposition 1 for proof of why the expected maximum utility in 
menu B increases with n).  
The second formulation considers the case in which the 
cost of decision making comes not from discovering the utility 
to be gained from each alternative, but rather from the act of 
comparing the utilities of each alternative to form a ranking and 
discover the maximum. Each comparison between two elements 
induces a cost of c. Thus, for a menu with n items,  
 
𝐾 𝑛 𝑐 ∗
𝑛!
2 ∗ 𝑛 2 !  
 
 In this formulation, the agent is able to know the utility 
of each element in a menu without cost, but the agent does not 
have a utility function that allows them to compare all elements 
simultaneously. The agent is only able to figure out which 
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element has the highest utility by searching the entire menu and 
ranking every element. This formulation assumes that the agent 
only uses pair-wise comparison and that, for simplicity, each 
comparison induces an equivalent cost. Once the agent has 
ranked each element, they will discover the element of greatest 
utility. One can imagine this cost becoming quite large when 
each element has multiple aspects to consider, such as a 
consumer deciding between apartment listings of different types 
and in different neighborhoods. As before, in the resulting value 
function, both the expected maximum utility in menu B and the 





Say an agent operates within a domain including the alternatives 
{o, a, b}. Suppose the agent is first faced with a two-item menu 
B = {o, a} which includes an alternative a and the option to 
defer the choice, o. The agent believes with probability 0.5 that 
they will experience U1 and with probability 0.5 that they will 
experience U2, defined as such 
 
 U1 U2 
o 0 0 
a 6 4 
b 6.5 3 
 
Each element incurs a cost of 2 to discover its utility. Will this 
agent experience Choice Overload? 
 
Solution: 
The expected utility from searching is  
𝐸 max
𝑎∈𝐵
𝑈𝑖 𝑎 0.5 ∗ 6 0.5 ∗ 4 5, 
The cost of evaluating every item in B is 
K(n) = c*n = 2 ∗ 2 4  
The expected maximum utility is more than the cost of 
evaluating the menu, 5 > 4, thus the agent does not experience 
choice overload and chooses the alternative that maximizes 
utility for the true utility function. In this case, whether that is 
U1  or U2 make no difference since the agent chooses a in both. 
 Now say that the agent faces a three-item menu B  = 
{o, a, b} which includes an alternatives a and b and the option 
to defer the choice, o. With the same utility discovery cost, will 
the agent now experience Choice Overload? 
 
Solution: 
The expected utility from searching is  
𝐸 max
𝑎∈𝐵
𝑈𝑖 𝑎 0.5 ∗ 6.5 0.5 ∗ 4 5.25, 
The cost of evaluating every item in B  is 
K(n) = c*n = 2 ∗ 3 6  
The expected maximum utility is less than the cost of evaluating 
the menu, 5.25 < 6, thus the agent does experience choice 
overload and chooses to defer. 
 
Model 2: The Regret Aversion Model 
 
In this model type, the cost of making a choice comes 
not from the effort or time required to make the choice, but is 
instead from the potential regret the agent may face after making 
the choice. In this case, the actual process of evaluating the 
items in a menu and figuring out which one is the potential 
maximum is assumed away to isolate the effect of the cost of 
regret. The agent doesn t have to incur any cost at the moment 
of the decision. After the choice is made, however, the agent 
may induce a cost in the form of regret. Regret occurs because 
the agent does not actually know their preferences until after 
they have made a choice. For example, in the case where a 
consumer is shopping for a computer, one option might have 
better battery life, but another option has a bigger screen size 
(which the consumer perceives as a positive thing). The 
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consumer may not yet know which of these two factors they will 
end up valuing more. In one scenario, they may end up finding 
that they value battery life more and regret choosing the option 
with the bigger screen, but the reverse is also possible. One can 
see how increasing the amount of options or increasing the 
amount of option attributes would put the consumer at an even 
greater risk for finding out that another option would have been 
better, thus incurring greater regret. Eventually, the potential 
regret a decision could produce could become so great that the 
consumer experiences choice overload and defers the choice 
saying, I ll come back to Best Buy another day.  
To begin talking about regret formally, suppose that 
there are two periods, t=0 or 0+. At t=0, the agent has a utility 
function U0, and at t=0+, the agent is either going to have the 
utility function U1 or  U2. At t=0, the agent faces a menu and 
makes a choice, but at t=0+, the agent potentially faces some 
regret about the choice in t=0.  
To create a model that incorporates regret as a cost, the 
MinMax Regret Model is used as a base. (Hayashi, 2007) This 
base equation can then be expanded upon to incorporate regret 
as the cost of making a choice and accommodate Choice 
Overload behavior (For further description of the MinMax 
Regret model and a discussion on why the MinMax Regret 
model itself cannot serve as a comprehensive model of Choice 
Overload, please see the Appendix). Say that as an agent 
evaluates each alternative, they assume the worst possible 
outcome for each alternative. That is, just as is described in the 
MinMax Regret model, the agent sets the value of the alternative 
as the future utility it would have if it was chosen in the situation 
in which it would produce the most regret possible. This future 
utility is generated from the utility the agent would gain from 
the alternative itself and the cost of regret from having chosen 
that utility. Once the perceived future utility of each alternative 
is set, the agent then chooses the highest utility among them and 
the alternative that would produce it. In other words, this agent 
assumes the worst possible scenario and tries to hedge their bets 
by choosing the alternative that would do the best in the worst 
case scenario. If the second period turns out to be better than the 
worst case scenario, then the agent will experience a better 
situation than their perceived future utility. If they had chosen a 
different alternative, however, they would have experienced 
worse regret.   
Defining the model formally, for a menu B with two 
possible future utility functions U1, U2 for alternative a, the 




min 𝑈1 𝑎 𝜆 max𝑎∈𝐵 𝑈1 𝑎 𝑈1 𝑎 , 𝑈2 𝑎 𝜆 max𝑎∈𝐵 𝑈2 𝑎 𝑈2 𝑎    
 




min 𝑈1 𝑎 𝜆 max𝑎∈𝐵 𝑈1 𝑎 𝑈1 𝑎 , 𝑈2 𝑎 𝜆 max𝑎∈𝐵 𝑈2 𝑎 𝑈2 𝑎    
 
This formulation uses the general concept of the 
MinMax Regret model in a new way. Just as in the base regret 
model, the agent faces two possible utility functions. That is, 
each item has two possible utility values depending on which 
utility function is realized in the second period. In real life, an 
agent may face more than two possible utility functions, but two 
are used here for simplicity. 
Let the following portion of the model representing the 
agent s possible Future Utilities from choosing alternative a be 
defined as such 
 
𝐹𝑈 𝑎|𝐵 min 𝑈1 𝑎 𝜆 max𝑎∈𝐵 𝑈1 𝑎 𝑈1 𝑎 , 𝑈2 𝑎 𝜆 max𝑎∈𝐵 𝑈2 𝑎 𝑈2 𝑎  
 
 In this portion of the model, the agent evaluates the 
possible utility gain from choosing a in both circumstances. In 
either case, the agent would receive the utility gain of having a, 
𝑈 𝑎 , but they would suffer the regret given the realized utility 
function, max 𝑈 𝑈 𝑎 . This regret comes from the potential 
utility gain lost if the maximizer of that utility function is not 
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chosen (presumably because the agent chose the maximizer for 
the other possible utility function). The parameter 𝜆 is a measure 
of how strongly the agent experiences regret. If 𝜆 is low, then 
regret does not as strongly affect that agent s decision, while if 
𝜆 is high, then the agent cares greatly about the possible regret 
from their choice. If 𝜆 0, then the agent does not experience 
regret and simply maximizes the lowest possible utility gained 
from each alternative. The agent then takes the lesser of the two 
possible future utilities and considers that value the predicted 
Future Utility from that alternative. Once the predicted Future 
Utilities are calculated for each alternative, the agent then 
chooses the alternative that provides the highest utility. This 
alternative becomes their choice, C(B). In this way, the agent 
minimizes the potential regret should the worst case scenario 
occur. 
The following example shows how this model matches 
the Choice Overload evidence by violating the standard model 
properties described in Proposition 1 and 2.  
 
Example 1: Nonmonotonicity and Choice Deferral  
 
Say that an agent with 𝜆 1 operates within a domain 
including an outside option  representing deferral, o, and two 
alternatives a and b. The agent chooses first from an menu B 
comprised of just a and o Thus, B = {o, a}. To make this 
example more concrete, o can represent the apartment the agent 
currently lives in and a can represent the apartment they can 
move into. In State 1, U1 is realized and in State 2, U2 is realized. 
These utility functions and alternatives are defined by the 
following values: 
 
 U1 U2 
o 1 1 
a 6 -1 
b -2 7 
Given these values, the agent s perceived Future Utility from 
each alternative is as follows 
 
𝐹𝑈 𝑜|𝐵 min 1 6 1 , 1 1 1  4 
   𝐹𝑈 𝑎|𝐵 min 6 6 6 , 1 1 1  3 
   
With these Future Utility values, the agent s choice is then 
 
𝐶 𝑜, 𝑎 argmax
𝑎∈𝐵
𝐹𝑈 𝑜|𝐵 , 𝐹𝑈 𝑎|𝐵 𝑎 
 
Since 𝐹𝑈 𝑎|𝐵  𝐹𝑈 𝑜|𝐵 , the agent chooses a from 
B. In this smaller menu, though alternative a poses some risk of 
regret if U2 is realized (-1  (1+1) = -3), the possible regret from 
not choosing a and instead choosing o followed by the 
realization of U1 (1  (6  1) = -4) is too great for the agent to 
bear. Thus the agent chose a. This could be a circumstance 
where apartment a has a much better price than apartment o, but 
the location of a might be a little worse than the agent s current 
apartment. Because the price is so much better, the agent decides 
to move and take the risk that they might regret downgrading 
their location. 
Say that the agent then chooses from a menu B  
comprised of o, a, and a new alternative b (that is, B  = {o, a, 
b}). Now the agent s perceived Future Utility from each 
alternative is as follows 
  
𝐹𝑈 𝑜|𝐵′ min 1 6 1 , 1 7 1  5 
𝐹𝑈 𝑎|𝐵′ min 6 6 6 , 1 7 1  9 
𝐹𝑈 𝑏|𝐵′ min 2 6 2 , 7 7 7  10 
 
With these Future Utility values, the agent s choice is then 
 
𝐶 𝑜, 𝑎, 𝑏 argmax
𝑎∈𝐵
𝐹𝑈 𝑜|𝐵 , 𝐹𝑈 𝑎|𝐵 , 𝐹𝑈 𝑏|𝐵 𝑜  
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Since 𝐹𝑈 𝑜|𝐵′  𝐹𝑈 𝑎|𝐵′ 𝐹𝑈 𝑏|𝐵′ , the agent 
chooses o from B  and thus defers the decision by going with 
the outside option. Contrasting with the result of the smaller 
menu, in this larger menu both the regret from choosing a and 
realizing U2 (-1  (7 + 1) = -9) and the regret from choosing b 
and realizing U1 (-2  (6 + 2) = -10) are so great that the 
relatively small regret from choosing o while realizing either 
state (1  (6  1) = -4 or 1  (7  1) = -5) seems to be the more 
attractive option, thus pushing the agent to choose o, deferral. 
To put it in more qualitative terms, when the third option is 
added, the possible future utilities for the agent become much 
more extreme. If a and b are two different apartments the agent 
is considering moving into, the situation in this larger menu 
presents two risky options that counterbalance one another. This 
could be a circumstance in which one apartment has a great 
price and bad location and the other has a terrible price, but 
fantastic location. In the Regret Aversion model, the agent does 
not know if they value price or location more, and they will not 
find out until they make a decision between the two. With the 
added uncertainty from the extreme utilities and extreme 
potential regrets, the agent decides to not take the risk and 
instead chooses the safer option of going with what they already 
know. That is, they defer the choice and went with an outside 
option, a default option. In this case, that outside option is 
staying in the apartment the agent already lives in. This situation 
seems to mirror the thought processes of some real life 
consumers when faced with the need to choose from a large 
menu. 
This example shows how the Regret Aversion model is 
able to accommodate the observed behaviors called Choice 
Overload. First, observe that the value of the menu was 
decreased by adding another alternative. Specifically, 𝑉 𝐵
 3 while 𝑉 𝐵′ 5. This result is in line with Choice 
Overload s property of nonmonotonicity, thus violating 
Proposition 1. Second, observe that in the smaller menu, a non-
deferral choice was selected, a, but in the larger menu, the agent 
opted instead for deferral, o. In this way, the result demonstrates 
the choice deferral behavior of Choice Overload and violates 
Proposition 2.  
Beyond accommodating the possibility of Choice 
Overload, this model further follows the psychological evidence 
by allowing circumstances in which adding more options can 
increase the value of the menu and lead to results other than 
deferral. As discussed in Section 2, adding more options to a 
menu does not always result in Choice Overload. In fact, one 
study by Liat Hadar and Sanjay Sood (2014) observed how the 
occurrence of Choice Overload in larger menus is moderated by 
what they term subjective knowledge,  which is defined as 
how knowledgeable the agent feels about the alternatives from 
which they choose. They use the example of wine and soda. 
With wines, most people do not feel so knowledgeable about all 
the attributes of wine and their respective values. With soda, 
most people feel very knowledgeable about the difference in 
taste and thus their different personal values. Hadar and Sood 
showed that for domains in which the agent has a high level of 
subjective knowledge, the agent is more likely to make a choice 
when presented with a smaller menu, supporting the behavior of 
Choice Overload. For domains in which the agent has a low 
level of subjective knowledge, however, the agent is more likely 
to make a choice when presented with a larger menu, supporting 
the classical belief that more is better . This observation could 
explain why there are many more options for wines than there 
are sodas.  
The Regret Aversion model presented in this paper is 
able to accommodate instances of both. Specifically, the model 
can show instances of monotonicity and instances of 
nonmonotonicity, instances where the conclusion of 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives hold and instances of 
Choice Deferral. Interestingly, this model can also include some 
measure of subjective knowledge. If a person has a higher 
subjective knowledge about their alternatives, then the different 
possible values for any one alternative should be closer together. 
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That is, the agent is more certain about what the value of the 
alternative will be. Including subjective knowledge, however, is 
not the focus of this model and is left to future models for further 
development. 
The previous example demonstrated Choice Overload. 
The following example demonstrates how the model can also 
allow for the classical belief of more is better . 
 
Example 2: An Instance of More is Better  
 
Say that an agent with 𝜆 1 operates within a domain 
including an outside option  representing deferral, o, and two 
alternatives a and b. The agent chooses first from an menu B 
comprised of just a and o Thus, B = {o, a}. To make this 
example more concrete, o can represent the apartment the agent 
currently lives in and a can represent the apartment they can 
move into. In State 1, U1 is realized and in State 2, U2 is realized. 
These utility functions and alternatives are defined by the 
following values: 
 
 U1 U2 
o 1 1 
a 6 -1 
b 2 4 
 
Given these values, the agent s perceived Future Utility from 
each alternative is as follows 
 
𝐹𝑈 𝑜|𝐵 min 1 6 1 , 1 1 1  4 
𝐹𝑈 𝑎|𝐵 min 6 6 6 , 1 1 1  3 
 
Since 𝐹𝑈 𝑎|𝐵  𝐹𝑈 𝑜|𝐵 , the agent chooses a from B. 
 
 Say that the agent then chooses from a menu B  
comprised of o, a, and a new alternative b (that is, B  = {o, a, 
b}). Now the agent s perceived Future Utility from each 
alternative is as follows 
  
𝐹𝑈 𝑜|𝐵′ min 1 6 1 , 1 4 1  4 
𝐹𝑈 𝑎|𝐵′ min 6 6 6 , 1 4 1  6 
𝐹𝑈 𝑏|𝐵′ min 2 6 2 , 4 4 4  2 
 
Since 𝐹𝑈 𝑏|𝐵′  𝐹𝑈 𝑜|𝐵′ 𝐹𝑈 𝑎|𝐵′ , the agent chooses b 
from B . 
 
This example shows how the Regret Aversion model is 
able to accommodate the behaviors put forth in the standard 
economic model. First, observe that the value of the menu was 
increased by adding another alternative. Specifically, 𝑉 𝐵
 3 while 𝑉 𝐵′ 2. This result is in line with the standard 
model s property of monotonicity, thus following Proposition 1. 
Second, observe that in the smaller menu, a non-deferral choice 
was selected, a, and in the larger menu, the agent simply 
selected another non-deferral alternative with a higher utility. In 
this way, the result demonstrates the preference transitivity  
behavior of standard Utility Maximization model and follows 
Proposition 2. This kind of flexibility allows the Regret 
Aversion model to more closely follow the psychological 
evidence than a model which always results in Choice Overload 
when more alternatives are added to a menu. 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
4. 1 Comparing Models  
The above Search Cost models and the Regret Aversion 
model are just some of the possible formulations that could build 
on the standard Utility Maximization model of economics to 
explain the mechanism of Choice Overload. Given the (ironic) 
variety of possible formulations, is it possible to determine if 
one is more accurate to the observed data than another? Further 
research to explore this question might include field tests that 
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measure the rate at which consumers turn to a default or deferral. 
Other experiments might include surveying consumers before, 
during, and after making a choice to see if the perceived cost 
occurred during the process of deciding or afterwards.  
In fact, Iyengar and Lepper did something just like that 
in that same aforementioned study (2000). In the same study 
involving chocolate-loving Columbia University students 
choosing chocolate pieces from a set, Iyengar and Lepper 
sought to investigate which of the two mechanisms, search cost 
or regret, the subjects were thinking with as they experienced 
Choice Overload. To do this, they made a few assumptions. 
First, they assumed that those who suffer a search cost end up 
satisficing in the extensive choice scenario. Because they 
satisfice, they should report that they feel they are making a less 
informed decision and they should be more likely to opt for a 
default option. Additionally, they should feel less confident 
about their choice and predict lower satisfaction with their 
choice. That is, after they have chosen a chocolate and before 
they consume the piece they chose, they should predict that they 
might not be satisfied with their choice. Second, they assumed 
that those who suffer from the cost of regret might be more 
invested in the choice making process to avoid the potential 
regret, thus they should perceive the choice making process as 
more enjoyable yet also difficult and frustrating in the case of 
the extensive choice scenario.  
Iyengar and Lepper then set up an experiment to gather 
the relevant metrics. In this experiment, the Columbia students 
would be divided into the limited, extensive, and control groups 
as described in Section 1. If they are in an experimental group, 
they would choose a piece of chocolate from the set. Then, 
before they eat the chocolate, they are asked to rate themselves 
and their choices on a 1 to 7 scale. These ratings included 
metrics such as how often they choose a default option, their 
satisfaction with their choice, how informed they felt making 
the choice, how much they enjoyed the choice making process, 
how difficult or frustrating they found the choice making 
process, and then after consumption, did they experience any 
choice regret?   
The researchers found that there was no significant 
difference between the experimental groups in terms of 
confidence in their choice, anticipated satisfaction, how 
informed they felt, nor their tendency to choose a default. This 
all goes against the hypothesis that the subjects are thinking 
through the first mechanism of Choice Overload, search cost. 
The did, however, find that the extensive group did find the 
decision making process more enjoyable, difficult, and 
frustrating. These results support the hypothesis that the subjects 
thought through the second mechanism of Choice Overload, 
regret aversion.  
Though these results seem to indicate that the right  
model is the Regret Aversion model, recall that there exist other 
studies that show support for the use of both Choice Overload 
mechanisms. Some studies in fact show that methods of 
decision making change with the size of a menu (Mills, Meltzer, 
& Clark, 1977; Payne, 1982). Others show that regret may lead 
to preferring smaller menus (Sarver, 2008; Schwartz, 2004). 
Additionally, it may be the case that the assumptions made by 
Iyengar and Lepper are the incorrect assumptions to make to 
parse out which mechanism is at play. For example, as has been 
discussed, it may be the case that when subjects suffer a search 
cost, they more often just defer the cost rather than switch to a 
satisficing model. Indeed it may be the case that both 
mechanisms operate depending on the situation. Further 




Two applications are presented here as instances of 
pricing and product offering that can be uniquely explained by 
the Choice Overload models presented in this paper.  
The first application involves a seemingly obvious 
implication of both Choice Overload models: if a firm offers too 
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many options, decrease the number of options and sales will 
increase. In fact, one firm did just that. Proctor & Gamble is a 
company that produces a shampoo called Head and Shoulders. 
Initially, Proctor & Gamble offered 26 different varieties of this 
shampoo, varying by factors such as scent and hair benefits. 
Seemingly following the advice of early marketing studies and 
psychological studies of Choice Overload, the company decided 
to decrease their product line to just 15 types of shampoo. The 
standard model would say that customers would then be less 
attracted to Head and Shoulders compared to other shampoo 
brands which offer a larger variety. Even Iyengar and Lepper s 
research would indicate that at least in terms of initial 
attractiveness, this decrease in variety could indeed harm the 
Head and Shoulder s brand perception. In fact, Proctor & 
Gamble experienced a 10% increase in sales after this change 
(Osnos, 1997). This matches the behavior as predicted by either 
model of Choice Overload presented here. Decreasing the 
number of alternatives decreased both the search cost and the 
possible regret from making a choice, thus turning some of the 
consumers who before would defer such a choice now into 
purchasing customers.  
The second application involves the difference in 
pricing between convenience stores or drugstores, such as 
Walgreens, and supermarkets, such as Walmart. Because of the 
much larger variety of products that can be found at Walmart, 
everything obtainable in a Walgreens could also be found at 
Walmart. The standard model would then say that this greater 
variety offers greater value to the consumer. Thus, the 
supermarket should be able to charge a higher price for its 
products. In fact, most know very well that Walgreen s prices 
are much higher than Walmart prices, even for the same items. 
In fact, one study showed that for the same basket of products, 
Walgreens (WAG) charged roughly 40% more than did 
Walmart (WMT) (Peterson, 2014). 
 
Figure 1. Source: Sterne Agee 
One might argue that the higher prices of stores such as 
Walgreens are due to the convenience of access. They d say 
customers are willing to pay higher prices to avoid travelling 
longer distances to get to the store. In fact, a study conducted on 
the drivers of pricing of staple foods in supermarkets versus 
small food stores found that prices of smaller stores did not 
significantly differ between stores that were isolated,  defined 
as stores that were greater than one mile away from the nearest 
supermarket, and those that were not (Caspi, 1997). This 
indicates that the higher prices of smaller stores with less 
variety, such as Walgreens, is not driven by a difference in travel 
convenience from the home to the store.  
The higher prices, however, do seem consistent with 
the predicted behavior of the Choice Overload models. These 
models predict that the smaller variety of products found at 
Walgreens offers customers an easier shopping experience by 
lowering the cost of searching for the right choice and the cost 
of potential regret from realizing that the customer could have 
chosen a better alternative. At a larger store like Walmart, 
customers would have to spend more time searching for the right 
item, and they would be aware of the wider variety of 
alternatives causing them greater potential regret. Thus, the 
Choice Overload models predict that the smaller store with its 
easier shopping experience would offer the customers greater 
value and thus be able to charge higher prices. Intuitively, this 
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result seems to match the observed pricing behavior. It is left to 
future research to demonstrate this more formally with demand 
functions that include Choice Overload. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
The standard model of economics, namely Utility 
Maximization, is able to account for many generalized 
behaviors of human decision making, but it cannot account for 
the phenomenon known as Choice Overload. In this paper, two 
different models were introduced to try to add onto the standard 
model and find a way to include Choice Overload in the set of 
economically explained behaviors. They cover the two main 
mechanisms of Choice Overload put forth by the preceding 
psychological research, and further research is needed to 
discriminate in which situations each model applies and what 
other factors influence an agent s experience of Choice 
Overload. The Search Cost model and the Regret Aversion 
models are intended to at least be starting points on which 
further economic research on Choice Overload can build. These 
models help to understand how humans make choices, and how 
sometimes variety can have a dark side. 
 
6. APPENDIX 
The MinMax Regret Model 
 
In the MinMax Regret Model model, (Hayashi, 2007) 
the regret from choosing item a from menu B is defined as 
 
𝑅 𝑎|𝐵 max   max
𝑏∈𝐵
𝑢1 𝑏 𝑢1 𝑎 ,    max𝑏∈𝐵 𝑢2 𝑏 𝑢2 𝑎   
 
In this model, the agent may end up having preferences 
defined by U1 or U2. In both states, possible regret comes from 
the difference between the highest utility element in menu B and 
the utility of the chosen element a. The potential regret that the 
agent worries about is the scenario in which the regret from 
choosing a is higher, thus they take the maximum of the two 
scenario regrets and that becomes the perceived potential regret 
of the choice. The agent then makes a choice from the menu by 
minimizing the regret and choosing the item with the smallest 
perceived regret. The agent minimizes the maximum possible 
regret, hence why it is called the MinMax Regret model. For the 
reasons explained below, in this model an agent is either always 
worse off or indifferent from having larger menus when, in fact, 
larger menus can sometimes make the agent better off. 
 
Difference Between Regret Models 
 
If one were to use the MinMax Regret model for the 
two Regret Aversion model examples above, one would 
generate the same choice for Example 1 and a similar result for 
Example 2, with the agent indifferent between a and b instead 
of having a strict preference for b, so it might seem that the two 
models are nearly the same. A third example, however, can 
demonstrate at least one key difference between the two models. 
 
Example 3: Difference of Regret Models 
 
Say that an agent with 𝜆 1 operates within a domain 
including an outside option  representing deferral, o, and two 
alternatives a and b. The agent chooses first from an menu B 
comprised of just a and o Thus, B = {o, a}. To make this 
example more concrete, o can represent the apartment the agent 
currently lives in and a can represent the apartment they can 
move into. In State 1, U1 is realized and in State 2, U2 is realized. 
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 U1 U2 
o 1 1 
a 2 2 
b 3 3 
 
Given these values, the agent s perceived Future Utility from 
each alternative is as follows 
 
𝐹𝑈 𝑜|𝐵 min 1 2 1 , 1 2 1  0 
𝐹𝑈 𝑎|𝐵 min 2 2 2 , 2 2 2  2 
 
Since FU a|B  FU o|B , the agent chooses a from B. 
 
Implementing the MinMax Regret model, the regret from each 
alternative is as follows 
 
𝑅 𝑜|𝐵 max 2 1, 2 1  1 
𝑅 𝑎|𝐵 max 2 2, 2 2  0 
 
Minimizing the regret, the agent would still choose a from B. 
 
Say that the agent then chooses from a menu B  comprised of o, 
a, and a new alternative b (that is, B  = {o, a, b}). Now the 
agent s perceived Future Utility from each alternative is as 
follows 
  
𝐹𝑈 𝑜|𝐵′ min 1 3 1 , 1 3 1  1 
𝐹𝑈 𝑎|𝐵′ min 2 3 2 , 2 3 2  1 
𝐹𝑈 𝑏|𝐵′ min 3 3 3 , 3 3 3  3  
 
Since 𝐹𝑈 𝑏|𝐵′  𝐹𝑈 𝑜|𝐵′ 𝐹𝑈 𝑎|𝐵′ , the agent chooses b 
from B . 
 
Implementing the MinMax Regret model, the regret from each 
alternative is as follows 
𝑅 𝑜|𝐵′ max 3 1, 3 1  2 
𝑅 𝑎|𝐵′ max 3 2, 3 2  1 
𝑅 𝑏|𝐵′ max 3 3, 3 3  0 
 
Minimizing the regret, the agent would again still choose b from 
B .  
 
There is an important difference here between the 
results of the two models of regret. While the MinMax Regret 
model is able to generate the same choices, it does not lead to 
the same monotonicity (or nonmonotonicity) results that the 
Regret Aversion model can accommodate. In the example 
above, the agent s utility is shown to increase when first 
choosing from B and then from B  using the Regret Aversion 
Model. In other words, the agent follows standard monotonicity 
behavior. Using the MinMax Regret model, the agent 
experiences no such gain in utility. In fact, the regret 
experienced by choosing from the two menus is the same, thus 
the agent is indifferent between choosing from the larger menu 
versus the smaller menu. This is neither monotonicity nor 
nonmonotonicity. In this way, the MinMax Regret model cannot 
demonstrate the same change in utility from differently sized 
menus, thus the two models are distinguished. 
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